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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to define a methodology that clarifies some crucial aspects of scientific representative practices. 
As a case study, this method explores the use of models and relates it to specific practical functions. In the first section, 
I emphasize the fruitfulness of a philosophical enquiry that accounts for the aims and the objectives towards which 
scientific practices direct their interest. Secondly, by using symmetry as a case study, I try to show that philosophy can 
find rich pathways of interaction with sciences, by proposing a dynamical approach to scientific representation. In the 
third section of the paper, I shall refer to examples that highlight the use of symmetry in current scientific representative 
practices. I shall conclude with some remarks on this method and its epistemological implications on our conception of 
objectivity and symmetry. 
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Introduction 
 
What we call ―symmetry‖ refers to a rich variety (we talk about symmetries in plural) of 
different possible operations that inform our current scientific theories and practices. For this 
specific reason, symmetry is a suitable case study in order to reflect upon scientific representative 
practices in general. Symmetries have attracted and still attract the interest of scientists and 
philosophers. The huge amount of published studies allows us to investigate a wide range of 
scientific practices, as well as different methodologies at stake in different contexts. In expounding 
the aims underlying the choice of representing organic and inorganic processes by means of 
symmetries, the questions of the status and reification of symmetries in the world arise. What is the 
ontological status of symmetries? Are they something physical? In some cases the answer is 
straightforward: symmetries are just mathematical operations. In other cases, however, it is far from 
being unproblematic to define their status and they appear to have physical meaning, as it is in the 
case of Quantum systems. 
The distinction between mathematical and physical symmetries still leaves the ontological 
question of their status open and this paper approaches this topic from a fresh perspective in order 
to add a small piece into the picture, by constraining symmetries as a case study into a wider 
framework. Symmetries in physics, engineering, chemistry and biology will be briefly reviewed and 
framed within the reflection upon the scientific practices in which they are involved. They will be 
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investigated in the context of the use that science and practitioners make of them, rather than be 
analyzed per se as metaphysical entities.  
In order to expound our strategy, let us consider what follows. ―The most important lesson 
that we have learned in this century is that the secret of nature is symmetry‖. With this statement D. 
Gross (1999, p. 57) echoed the method that Hermann Weyl advanced in Symmetry (1952). Weyl 
firmly believed that our a priori statements in physics are grounded on symmetry. Nevertheless, the 
fact that symmetry can act as a canon in informing scientific theories and models, does not prove 
that symmetry is a secret of nature. On the contrary, they appear as a result of a complex 
mathematical and methodological procedure that we developed in the last century in order to 
classify the laws of nature and take control over phenomena. 
For what concerns the question of whether symmetries correspond to actual processes in 
nature, if we follow upon Gross, we are tempted to agree with this. However, upon closer 
examination, Weyl also held a slightly different view. Symmetry (specifically in physics) does not 
correspond to the secret that nature is hiding; rather it appears to be one of the most powerful 
operations to order the interactions produced by processes that we are still trying to determine and 
clarify.
1
  
Weyl also proposed to refer geometrical symmetry (bilateral and rotational symmetries) to 
certain operations that can be detected in both scientific and artistic representative practices: 
―Symmetry, as wide or as narrow as you may define its meaning, is one idea by which man through 
the ages has tried to comprehend and create order, beauty and perfection‖ (Weyl 1952, p. 5). The 
fact that we appeal to symmetry in different fields means that there are different representative 
practices that can employ analogous operations. If we take symmetry as being one of those 
operations unifying our methodology in different practices, we might discover that symmetry ceases 
to be a ―secret of nature‖, and rather appears as a truth or a canon of representative practices. 
However, it must be conceded that there is more than a mere analogy between the results of 
interactions and the operations that we perform: this analogy rests on the ground of the operation of 
mapping the unity of the system under analysis according to an automorphism. It would be 
inadequate to restrict the question of the status of symmetries to this analogy without expounding 
the role they play in scientific practices.  In other words, to restrict our investigation to the possible 
kinds of symmetries that could find physical meaning is not satisfactory from both a scientific and 
philosophical perspective. It appears to be relevant to focus on the fact that in current scientific 
practices, we can detect methods that allow the acquisition of the correspondence between model-
systems and target-systems, for instance, even if it is just in terms of an approximation, as well as in 
terms of a cross-check between mathematical models and measurements of actual interactions. 
These questions must be thought in relationship to the undeniable fact that there is an idealized 
                                                        
1
 Weyl believed that there is a physical process in nature that determines the success of the use of symmetry in physics 
in terms of prediction (see Weyl, 1952, p. 25). The perspective according to which symmetry works as a sort of 
regulative principle that can be supplemented by a deterministic theory via the development of physics has been 
endorsed by Wigner (1967). For an overview on the topic of symmetries in physics, see Brading and Castellani (2003). 
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status of symmetries that show their operational character together with the fact that in some 
specific contexts they assume physical meaning in modelling phenomena.  
In order to assess the nature of these methods, I suggest to look at what scientists do when 
they appeal to symmetries, namely at the aims that are at stake in scientific representative practices. 
The fruitfulness of this approach lies in the fact that in our specific case study we detect the 
unifying role of symmetries, according to certain practical functions. This in turn allows us to see 
that symmetry help us to encompass phenomena into a system of principles and rules aiming at the 
unity of their representation: these principles and rules are chosen according to aims, objectives, and 
criteria of unification that fit the unity of the processes under analysis. 
The same procedure holds for other criteria or canons that we might endorse in scientific 
representation. Therefore, this procedure is not just a peculiar feature of models constructed 
according to spacetime symmetries or geometrical symmetries. To the scientific representation 
employing models are to be ascribed functions that do not pertain to the mere description or 
denotation of target systems. We certainly find more than mere denotation, for instance, in the 
engineering model of a bridge performed according to robustness criteria and in general in all 
performance-based models that aim at explaining phenomena such as failure, cracks, and so forth.  
In what follows I shall propose and discuss the reasons why our conceptions of 
representation and correspondence are to be re-shaped in the context of what I call a ‗dynamical 
approach‘ to scientific representation. This aspect is clarified in the next section and it is the starting 
point of our reflections. 
 
Part I: Scientific representation or scientific representative practices? 
 
In what follows I shall advance the ‗dynamical approach‘ to scientific representation, 
according to which, in different sciences, principles and rules are chosen according to aims, 
objectives, and criteria of unification that select and inform the unity (or a specific type of unity 
among others) of the processes under analysis, even if the resulting models are just an 
approximation of these processes (be these data or phenomena as target-system). Before dealing 
with this approach, I shall expound the reason why it is more appropriate to talk about 
representative practices instead of representation, and why our conception of representative 
practices should consider the aims and the objectives towards which they direct their interest.  
The expression ‗representative practices‘ might recall Sorrell‘s (2004) or Lynch and 
Woolgar‘s (1990) works. The present perspective, however, does not approach the subject 
sociologically or from a Peircean stance. Nevertheless, it recognizes the framework of the social 
human activity that informs both scientific and artistic representative practices. My claim is that the 
aims and the objectives pertaining to these practices cannot be isolated from the use of model-
systems and specific practical functions. These aims and objectives are part of model-systems, 
because, in informing them, they allow the ―acquisition of the correspondence‖ with a target 
system.  
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This observation might open interesting perspectives, if applied to the current debate on 
scientific representation in the philosophy of science.  
The richness of this debate offered several answers to the constitution of model-systems 
informing scientific representation. Most of these answers, as far as I can see, assume that this is a 
debate concerning the actuality, the possibility or the impossibility of a certain relation of 
correspondence between model-system and target-system, be the latter referred to data or 
phenomena.
2
  
Since models are one of the most fundamental tools used in sciences, I shall briefly refer to 
the current debate in the philosophy of science in order to frame the close relationship between 
models and their practical functions and to highlight how the aims directing modelling can be 
encompassed into a dynamical approach to the question of scientific representation. I shall 
distinguish my position from others by referring to the expression ‗scientific representative 
practices‘, meaning the process of the aim-directed modelling entailing practical functions. 
 
A. Framing the question 
 
The debate concerning the status of scientific representation and the role played by models 
is object of extensive studies. Interestingly, some of them investigated the presence or the exclusion 
of the link between scientific and artistic representation. Callender and Cohen (2006), for instance, 
suggested that while there is no special problem about scientific representation, there is a general 
question involving representation, be it scientific or artistic. However, Callender and Cohen still 
share the same view advanced by the prominent participants to the mainstream debate: they are still 
endorsing a view according to which representation is a relation and involves a notion of 
correspondence. Also they maintain that this correspondence is grounded on arbitrary stipulation, 
even if they rightly proposed not to treat representation per se.3 I maintain that the distinction 
between art and science does not rely on operations as they are in themselves, rather on the way in 
which they are performed according to the aims that we ascribe to them: geometrical symmetry, for 
instance, can be used in scientific practices and in art as well. Albeit distinguished, art and sciences 
pertain to the same domain as being products of human social activities, and both scientists and 
artists interact, in very different ways, with the institutions.  
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 Within the debate on scientific representation, models received special attention. Giere claims that there is a 
―similarity‖ between a model and the world (Giere 1988, p. 81), depending on the intentions in designing and the use of 
the model performed by scientists (Giere 1992, pp. 122-123). Another claim is advanced by French, who identifies the 
relationship between model and the real world as partial isomorphism (French 2002). Other introduced the normative 
aspects in dealing with representation (Morrison 2006), as well as the interconnection of the representational and 
explanatory features of models (Morrison and Morgan 1999). 
3
 See Callender and Cohen (2006, p. 15): ―In particular, we propose that the varied representational vehicles used in 
scientific settings (models, equations, toothpick constructions, drawings, etc.) represent their targets (the behavior of 
ideal gases, quantum state evolutions, bridges) by virtue of the mental states of their makers/users. For example, the 
drawing represents the bridge because the maker of the drawing stipulates that it does, and intends to activate in his 
audience (consumers of the representational vehicle, including possibly himself) the belief that it does‖. The weakness 
of this point is highlighted by Frigg (2010). 
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Specifically, sciences are directed towards explicit or implicit aims, most of the time 
subordinated to the interests of political and economical institutions (in both the public and the 
private sector). It is undeniable that there is a strong link between our models and scientific theories, 
which are produced by complex activities, and our social practices, namely the fields and different 
activities in which we exert our knowledge, we acquire skills, we make experience and we set up 
the advancements for future development and research. Sciences are thus related to applications that 
transform the organization of our lives in the society. 
Nevertheless it would be far from a mere epistemological perspective to highlight the tasks 
linked to these interests. The question that should be raised here is the fact that due to this inevitable 
commitment to the social sphere and to the necessity of manipulation and control, scientific 
representative practices employ models that add something more to the model-descriptions.  
As Frigg (2010) argued ―model-descriptions usually only specify a handful of essential 
properties, but it is understood that the model-system has properties other than the ones mentioned 
in the description. Model-systems are interesting exactly because more is true of them than what the 
initial description specifies; no one would spend time studying model systems if all there was to 
know about them was the explicit content of the initial description. It is, for instance, true that the 
Newtonian model-system representing the solar system is stable and that the model-earth moves in 
an elliptic orbit; but none of this is part of the explicit content of the model-system‘s original 
specification‖.4 We might observe, however, that this difference in instantiation between model-
descriptions and model-systems depends on the aims attributed to the latter (albeit they are not to be 
identified with them) that are linked to concrete applications and to the aims of scientific 
representative practices in the human social organization (this is quite evident in the case of 
engineering practices or research in nanotechnology).  
Different ways of representing phenomena in sciences (but this holds in art as well) can 
share common characteristics, as the studies of Stegeman (1969), Callender and Craig (2006), and 
Frigg (2010) show. However, it can be shown that these representative practices also differ 
according to the different aims that are, so to speak, ‗attached‘ to the operations performed in their 
domains: the use of the model-system counts to mark this difference. This basic observation also 
holds within the same scientific domain when a mathematical model is related to a model system, 
which entails much more than the first model from it descends. 
Furthermore, same phenomena can be ‗represented‘, or better, modeled, in a different way 
by the engineer and the physicist (see section III example 4, when the engineering model is 
insufficient to fit the aims of the target-system, engineers appeal to physical model-systems), but 
same phenomena can be described or explained on the ground of different models, depending on the 
chosen aims. For example, in the case of a bridge one can perform the analysis concerning lateral 
and vertical vibrations on the ground of a numerical model. Engineers can do it, by endorsing a 
prescriptive or a performance-based approach or both of them. The design, thus, can proceed via 
models that are empirically informed, by taking into account human behavior in interacting with a 
structure, or via the application of physical or biological models that show, as a result, the behavior 
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 Frigg (2010, p. 102). 
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analogous to the processes of interest. Scientists from different fields also propose different 
considerations of causal laws, depending on the use of a scientific model that they chose to endorse. 
Same laws assume or lose relevance depending on the context in which they are used and produce a 
representation of the processes at stake directed towards aims (again see section III example 4, 
where from the virtual works principle descend two completely different models of physical 
systems and engineering models in the FEM, with inevitable consequences on the ‗representation‘ 
of the target system). Finally, an interesting example is offered by Hughes (1997) ―DDI‖ theory of 
representation, which identifies three elements pertaining scientific representation from an 
epistemological perspective: elements of ―denotation‖, ―demonstration‖, and ―interpretation‖. 
Hughes suggested that ―if we examine a theoretical model with these three activities in mind, we 
shall achieve some insight into the kind of representation that it provides‖ (Hughes 1997, pp. 329; 
335). The present perspective, as far as what I call ―practical functions‖ of scientific representative 
practices are concerned, is close to Hughes‘ stance. The problem thus concerns how we represent 
something, namely what counts in the present approach are the activities and the functions that we 
associate to the aims of modelling phenomena.  
 
B. Philosophy and scientific representative practices: the dynamical approach 
 
The concept of scientific representation gives us the chance to ask two main questions 
concerning 1) the possible ingredients of scientific reasoning and scientific representation and 2) the 
ways in which we produce and/or reproduce our scientific knowledge and representative practices. 
I am interested in the second aspect rather than in the first attempt, which is related to a 
metaphysical and ontological perspective that I call ‗the static approach‘ to scientific representation. 
We should start considering the idea of abandoning what I call a ‗static‘ idea of representation.  
Current debates on scientific representation and idealization descend from one of the most 
intricate philosophical questions, namely the possibility of any correspondence between thought and 
reality, and truth and reality. Even if the terms of the debate focus on data, models and scientific 
theories, the question of the possible relationship among them and its justification is far from being 
solved and is still drawn in terms of correspondence, no matter whether it is complete, incomplete 
or impossible (to these three terms we can refer the realist, antirealist and skeptic positions).
5
 
Correspondence is a result of a complex process of manipulation, unification and 
acquisition, rather than an assumption, and the mere concept of representation does not explain the 
dynamics of this process. Philosophy seems unable to resist the temptation of reflecting upon the 
concept of representation per se and to assume its relation with a theory of correspondence (or non-
                                                        
5
 The history of philosophy might help us in this case. It is not by chance that for modern philosophy, from Descartes 
onwards, the term ―representation‖ and its definition played a crucial role. By the end of the Seventeenth Century, 
representation had become a fundamental problem in epistemology, in natural philosophy, and in mathematics. In each 
of these fields, we can identify crucial topics that re-emerge in subsequent developments of the philosophy of science 
and epistemology. In 1780s Immanuel Kant tried to undermine the problem, by establishing that representation is a 
‗general mark‘ in logical terms: it is so general and vague that the problem of a theory of knowledge should concentrate 
rather on the operations of the mind and forget about the correspondence-theory problem involving the mere concept of 
representation (Vorstellung, repraesentatio). 
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correspondence). For instance, Frigg defines representation as follows: ―Representation then is the 
relation between a model-system and its target-system‖.6 He follows upon Callender and Cohen 
when he claims that ―It has been pointed out variously—and in my view correctly—that, in 
principle, anything can be a representation of anything else‖.7  
Therefore, at present, the concept of representation is one of those concepts that we cannot 
easily abandon, because it offered a rich source for reflection and invested the crucial 
epistemological problem of correspondence that engaged philosophers of science in the last 
decades, as well as philosophers in the last four hundred years.  
However, what if we change the conception of representation and correspondence 
underlying the studies on scientific representation? We might find perhaps that, even in the case of 
one of the most debated cases, the case of symmetry, our enquiry can find fruitful pathways of 
interaction with sciences. 
In order to reach this goal, I shall present and discuss the practical functions that are present 
in the use of symmetries. For each of these functions there are aims directly linked to the use of 
symmetry in different sciences. The aims that accompany our scientific representation in practice 
consist in: 
 
a. Definition of properties 
b. Classification 
c. Manipulation 
d. Finding of conserved quantities 
e. Selection of necessary rules 
 
The next step consist in showing that these aims are not at all arbitrary, but respond to 
necessary tasks of scientific practices that profoundly influence the organization of our life once 
they are applied to specific fields. 
 
Part II: Symmetry in context 
 
In this section I expound the nature of the dynamical approach to scientific representation 
and relate the use of symmetries to aims and practical functions. Even if it might appear at first 
sight that what follows consists in a mere review of case studies and examples, the reader will 
immediately notice that the thesis advanced in the previous section is tested and shows the extreme 
flexibility of the dynamical approach. While this first section aims at detecting the practical 
functions attached to our models, the last section will include the aims of scientific representative 
practices and by relating them to the practical functions, will directly embody the methodology of a 
dynamical approach to these practices. 
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 Frigg (2010, p. 99). 
7
 Frigg (2010, p. 99). 
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I have already highlighted the high prominence of symmetry as a suitable case study, given 
its wide use across sciences. Furthermore, I emphasized that symmetry embodies the role of a canon 
or a rule, which is not taken from experience, but is mathematically constructed: it is an operation. 
Those who believe that models are set-theoretic structures identified symmetry with a property of 
the relation or the structure: models are structures and they are composed mathematical or set-
theoretic entities.
8
 In these models, what counts consists in relations whose properties derive from 
reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry and so forth. I shall present now an alternative approach to deal 
with symmetry and scientific representation.
9
 
If we look at the practical implications of scientific representation, namely if we consider the 
dynamics at stake in scientific representative practices that employ different kinds of symmetries, 
we find that the aims are incorporated into the model system, which is not constituted by simple 
extensionally defined relations (see example B and section III example 4).
10
 The second point that 
the structuralist approach misses is that symmetry (a part from its mathematical formulation 
confined within its definition of automorphism) is not a relation that can be referred to objects 
without including properties that pertain to the specific system under analysis and that in some 
cases take into account not only the material properties of the objects, but also human behavior (as 
it is in the case of the performance-based approach and risk analysis of structures in civil 
engineering). With regard to this observation, it seems relevant to point out that in numerical 
models, for instance, qualitative variables or semi-quantitative variables can always be made 
quantitative through random assignment. However, this implies a complex process and cross-check 
methods according to the aim associated to the model: modelling depends on the aims of the 
representative practices at stake. As far as I can see, this complex activity would be missed by 
focusing on the mere extensional characterization of relations. Moreover, as we shall see in this 
section, symmetry appears more as an operation at stake in scientific representative practices, which 
does not exhaust the activity of modelling systems and processes. For this reason, a dynamical 
approach should be preferred, since it can be further enriched by features expounded by a static 
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  Van Fraassen (1980), Da Costa and French (1990). 
9
 I follow here Frigg´s observations on the structural realist stance: ―This definition of isomorphism brings a 
predicament to the fore: an isomorphism holds between two structures and not between a structure and a part of the 
world per se. In order to make sense of the notion that there is an isomorphism between a model-system and its target-
system, we have to assume that the target exemplifies a particular structure. The problem is that this cannot be had 
without bringing nonstructural features into play‖. This point is clearly shown in the case of engineering model-
systems, where even the material of the structure (i.e. wood, steal etc.) and the shape of the structural elements play a 
crucial role in modelling. 
10
 I endorse here once again Frigg‘s criticism of this view: ―For what follows it is important to be clear on what we 
mean by ―individual‖ and ―relation‖ in this context. To define the domain of a structure it does not matter what the 
individuals are—they may be whatever. The only thing that matters from a structural point of view is that there are so 
and so many of them. Or to put it another way, all we need is dummies or placeholders. Relations are understood in a 
similarly ―deflationary‖ way. It is not important what the relation ―in itself‖ is; all that matters is between which objects 
it holds. For this reason, a relation is specified purely extensionally, that is, as class of ordered n-tuples and the relation 
is assumed to be nothing over and above this class of ordered tuples. Thus understood, relations have no properties 
other than those that derive from this extensional characterization, such as transitivity, reflexivity, symmetry, etc. This 
leaves us with a notion of structure containing dummy-objects between which purely extensionally defined relations 
hold‖. 
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approach to scientific representation, but still has the advantage of capturing the complexity of the 
processes under analysis, by including the activity of data and model interpretations. I shall start 
with examples of symmetries in geometrical objects and their possible use in chemistry in order to 
highlight the present perspective, and I shall briefly refer in examples B) and C) to symmetries in 
physics.  
 
A- Examples of symmetries in geometrical objects are given by symmetries of 
transformations as rotations and reflections that leave geometric objects invariant. Symmetries of 
geometric objects are relevant in sciences, as shown in the case of a molecule with tetrahedrical 
symmetry. The CH 4  (methane molecule) has the form of a tetrahedron and the symmetry of the 
molecule usually determines some of the physical and chemical properties of the substance (for 
example the band structure that it shows in Infrared and Raman spectroscopy).
11
 We infer that if a 
molecule possesses inversion symmetry, this cannot have an electric dipole moment. Put in a 
different way, there is a point 

p such that the molecule is invariant under 
 
 

 xpx 2 .  
 
In this case we define invariance and an actual property, by acquiring a correspondence 
between what we can find in nature and the rules of symmetry that we follow in order to be oriented 
in practical experience. The aims associated with this practical function consists in manipulating 
and classifying physical bodies for further applications. 
 
B- Transformations of space and time that leave the equations of motion invariant 
constitute another example that is extremely helpful to show how we incorporate aims in scientific 
representative practices. For Newtonian physics these symmetries are the transformations forming 
the Galilei group, which is a 10 dimensional Lie Group: 
 
1) 0

 xxx    spatial translations 
2) 0ttt  t   time translations 
3) tvxx 0

  relative movement at constant velocity 
4) 

xRx 0    spatial rotations 
 
These symmetries are extremely relevant in physics, because we associate the aim of 
finding conserved quantities to the symmetries of the equations of motion, according to a practical 
function of prediction.  
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 Coates (2000, pp. 10815–10837). 
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For relativistic physics the equations are invariant under Lorentz transformations (which 
also are a 10 dimensional Lie Group). The translations and rotations act the same way as in the 
Galilei group, but the transformations that relate reference systems that are moving with constant 
velocity relative to each other act differently. Consider the equation: 
 
 
     
 
 
By assuming that Lorentz invariance is a fundamental symmetry of nature, then the form, 
which the equations of motion for the various matter fields and forces can take, is severely 
restricted. The practical function of prediction operates here in synergy with the practical function 
of restriction (see example C). Furthermore, we can detect the practical function of prediction, by 
considering Noether’s Theorem, which establishes that, if in a theory there is a continuous n-
parameter family of symmetries, then there are n conserved quantities. If the equations of motion 
for a field are invariant under time translations, there is a conserved energy density for this field. 
The scientific representative practice at stake here is one of the most relevant for models in physics 
and is directly linked to the practical function of prediction that we ascribe to scientific theories 
and models in general. 
 
C- Gauge symmetries that leave local equations of motion invariant are restrictive in terms 
of the equations of motion that they allow. Gauge symmetry plays a crucial role in the foundation of 
the Standard Model, given that the fundamental interactions (electromagnetic, weak and strong) are 
symmetric under a certain gauge symmetry: gauge symmetry dictates the form of the interactions 
and in doing so it allows to perform the practical function of restricting the equation of motion to 
be used in a certain scientific theory and in model-systems. Also it allows us to construct a system 
of interaction to classify phenomena at high energy scales. 
It must be noticed that in scientific representative practices three practical functions emerge 
from these examples: 
 
In case A we have the dominance of the function of invariance: we generally attribute 
objectivity to this function in order to define properties of the processes under analysis, classify 
and manipulate them for further aims.
12
 
In case B we have the dominance of the function of prediction: symmetry is of a 
fundamental significance in order to 1) find conserved quantities of a system independently from 
its degree of complexity, and 2) incorporate phenomena into a system via implemented 
classification (see case C). 
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 Note that symmetry is not to be completely identified with invariance as pointed out by Roman (2004, p. 6). 
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In case C we have the dominance of the practical function of restriction: symmetry allows 
the selection of necessary rules and principles to be used for further tasks within the framework of 
a specific theory and at the same time it informs its systematic and unified character. 
 
Part III: Symmetry and scientific representative practices 
 
In this last section, I shall refer to examples that highlight the use of symmetries in different 
fields as aim-directed scientific representative practices. I try to show that the dynamical approach 
to the question of scientific representation can highlight the complexity of current practices. What 
emerges in this section is the fact that depending on the aims embodied by models, different kinds 
of symmetries can be endorsed. I shall present four cases that might be read as being interconnected 
when interpreted as transitions of goal-directed modelling processes from one stage to a more 
complex one.  
1. When dealing with models concerning the behavior of snowflakes and crystals, the 
practical function of classification is clearly displayed by using geometrical symmetry. The 
symmetry is ―injected‖ in physical bodies to easily compare them with other samples. However, as 
shown in the X-ray and atomic force diagrams, geometrical symmetry allows an approximation, but 
not a pure correspondence between the model and the physical object. This idealization is directed 
towards aims of comparison, classification and intervention. 
2. One of the most intriguing cases to investigate concerns the application of Lie Groups to 
the structure of Hydrogen atom. Scientists insert operators to make it symmetrical in both the 
relativistic and non-relativistic case for the purpose of prediction and explanation that would be 
otherwise impossible to achieve by means of geometrical symmetry. This aspect is clearly pointed 
out by S. Singer.
13
 Her analysis focuses on how to make predictions about the numbers of each kind 
of basic state of a quantum system from only two ingredients: symmetry and the linear model of 
quantum mechanics. This method has wide applications in crystallography, atomic structure, 
classification of manifolds with symmetry and other fields. Also, as shown by S. J. Weinberg 
(2011), it is possible to generate SO(4) symmetry from Lie algebra in the methods for analyzing the 
hydrogen atom. Through the use of dynamical symmetry scientists provided a new approach to the 
―accidental degeneracy‖ of the hydrogen atoms energy levels and explained it. Further applications 
of this model in physics can be found in Vibron Model Description of molecules, the Interacting 
Boson Model of the Atomic Nucleus, the SU(3) classification of hadrons, and the Bose–Einstein 
condensates of spinor and tensor bosons. The hydrogen atom model inspires current studies in 
genetics and biology, as we shall see in the next example. 
3. One of the most well-established model-systems is the DNA Structure (Helical 
Symmetry). The reason why we use helical symmetry in modelling DNA structure has obvious 
practical implications in terms of description of the processes of its replication in order to intervene 
and manipulate them. We can perform dodecahedral rotation or privilege the axial view of DNA 
double helix, according to the aim of intervening on it and easily identify the processes of a certain 
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 Singer (2005, pp. 283-296). 
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interest in simulations and test. As R. Sinden (1994) argued, two-dimensional and three-
dimensional nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) data of DNA in solution provided three-
dimensional coordinates for the position of individual atoms in DNA, with the result that the picture 
that emerges is one of an extremely variable helical structure, not at all uniform and monotonous. 
Furthermore, the secondary structure of DNA can assume myriad alternative or non-B-DNA forms 
(which are the most common models used since 1960s and derived from X-ray diffraction 
analysis).
14
 The classical model is de facto insufficient when the evolution of the genetic code is 
considered. In genetics, scientists prefer to employ a pseudo-orthogonal (Lorentz like) symmetry in 
stochastic modelling, in order to ‗represent‘ a genetic network. In this way, models of gene 
expression are linked to the practical function of prediction of processes involved in the secondary 
structure of DNA. This practical function was weakened in the classical model. Rather, as I claimed 
in the previous example, the study of the energy levels of hydrogen atoms and the definition of 
degeneracy applied to them played a crucial role in developing models, which in turn are 
analogically applied to genetics: 
 
―The notion of degeneracy is profoundly related to that of symmetry. Degeneracy means invariance; 
in the present case, it means that the codon to amino acid assignment is invariant under the replacement of 
codons by synonymous ones. And invariance means symmetry, in the sense that one can build 
transformation groups that keep invariant certain properties. This kind of connection between symmetry and 
invariance can be seen in the spectrum of the hydrogen atom: this is a system with an obvious rotational 
symmetry, implying that states with the same azimuthal angular momentum quantum number m will have 
the same energy‖.15 
 
Scientists may refer to an algebraic approach in modelling the evolution of the genetic code: 
a current code is generated by a dynamical symmetry breaking process, starting out from an initial 
state of complete symmetry and ending in the observed final state of low symmetry. In both cases, 
symmetry plays a decisive role: in the first case, it is a characteristic (invariant) feature of the 
dynamics of the gene switch and its decay to equilibrium, whereas in the second, it provides the 
guidelines for the evolution of the coding.
16
 It is possible to identify in this procedure the practical 
functions of invariance, prediction and restriction associated to the use of symmetry in scientific 
representative practices. The following passage clarifies these aspects and we can detect in the 
scientists‘ words the operations they performed, according to the practical functions and the aims 
associated to their practice: 
 
―But symmetries may be much less obvious than in this case; they may be hidden! And there are many 
examples where the spectrum of a molecule or atom is a testimony of some hidden symmetry. Thus if we 
look at the genetic code from this point of view, as if it were some kind of spectrum, we face a 
straightforward question: is the degeneracy pattern of the code the expression of some hidden symmetry? 
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This promptly suggested performing what we may call ‗the search for symmetries in the genetic code‘. […] 
Lie group theory provides a well-developed mathematical machinery for modelling symmetry in biological 
systems. It provides not only a quantitative framework but also leads to biological insights about the 
processes that are modelled, as shown by the examples presented in this review. In the stochastic model for a 
two-state gene, symmetry has practical implications: the eigenvalue of the diagonal operator characterises 
the dynamics of the gene switch and the affinity between the regulatory protein and the gene operator site, 
whereas the non-diagonal operators connect the probability distributions of the two states. In addition, noise 
analysis leads to the conclusion that fast switching genes give rise to Poissonian distributions whereas slowly 
switching genes have broader or bi-peaked distributions. In the algebraic model for the evolution of the 
genetic code, possible pathways for this evolution arise naturally, but are strongly restricted. The picture of 
evolution by a stepwise incorporation of new amino acids fits perfectly with that of dynamical symmetry 
breaking. The Klein symmetry that has remained preserved can serve as an underlying principle that has 
conducted the evolution of the standard code as well as that of non-standard codes. In the modelling of gene 
networks, group theoretical tools can be useful for the search for a composition rule between two or more 
genes. Another feature is the possibility to model single genes that present more than two levels of 
regulation. The construction of a dynamical system for the evolution of the genetic code is also a possible 
future application of group theoretical methods in biology‖.17 
 
As it appears from this passage, we cannot detach a model system from its specific use. Moreover, 
as I have previously pointed out, what we call ―correspondence‖ in representing phenomena is 
nothing else but a process of fitting aims of scientific representative practices. The process of 
acquisition of the correspondence embodied in the model system is acquired by following a rule 
(Klein symmetry in this case) that allows the composition of standard code and non-standard codes. 
The endorsement of the abovementioned model based on the group theoretic approach is informed 
by the aim of reproducing a rule for the evolution of the genetic code. Therefore, its mathematical 
model shall reflect this aim and the resulting model system incorporates necessarily the practical 
functions of invariance, prediction and restriction pertaining to the use of symmetries. On the 
ground of heuristic considerations, scientists analogically construct the unity of the processes under 
analysis. This definition seems to be valid for model systems both referred to target-systems and 
actual phenomena. 
4. The aspects expounded in natural sciences and pertaining to scientific representative practices 
may well be found in engineering also. Symmetry in engineering modelling can be detected in the 
Finite element method (FEM). FEM is a technique originally developed for numerical solution of 
complex problems in structural mechanics. In the FEM, the structural system is modeled by a set of 
finite elements connected at points (or nodes). Elements may have physical properties, such as 
thickness, coefficient of thermal expansion, density, Young‘s modulus, shear modulus and 
Poisson‘s ratio. It is also possible to model straight or curved one-dimensional elements with 
physical properties such as axial bending and torsional stiffness. In engineering the use of this kind 
of elements aims at modelling the behavior of cables, braces, trusses, beams, stiffeners, grids and 
frames that in turn can be parts of more complex structures. The elements are placed at the 
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centroidal axis of the actual members. This allows engineers to model only half of the elements via 
axial symmetry in such a way that the analysis time is significantly reduced, as well as the cost. 
There is clearly a utilitarian function attributed to geometrical symmetry here. Indeed, the 
introduction of FEM has substantially decreased the time to take results to the production line. 
Through improved initial prototype designs using FEM testing and development have been 
accelerated and productivity increased. 
FEM has radically improved both the standard of engineering designs and the methodology 
of the design process in many applications. For example, in spice-compatible circuits and system 
simulators, it can be used a combination of analytic and numerical approaches in the FEM that 
generates other models to consider more complicated effects. In ―Behavioural modelling for 
heterogeneous systems based on FEM descriptions‖, J. Haase, S. Reitz, and P. Schwarz have shown 
that model-description are incorporated into model-systems to fit and predict the behavior of a 
certain structure. The combination of these models into one model-system is determined by the laws 
at stake (in the specific case, a generalization of Kirchhoff‘s Current Law) that regulate the unity of 
the process under analysis. The method of incorporation of two or more model-descriptions into one 
model-system allows the use of analytical FEM formulas for the construction of behavioral models, 
to derive behavioral models with fixed numerical values for components from FEM descriptions, 
and the implementation of models in different languages (MAST, HDL-A, VHDL-AMS). This 
methodology employed in engineering encompasses geometrical symmetry in the FEM, and use it 
for constraining relations among structural components and to restrict the variables in mathematical 
models when the performance-based approach is endorsed. The latter operation seems to point 
towards an account of models different from the structural realist stance. Moreover, this last 
example confirms that the use of a model (be it a model-description or a model-system) makes the 
difference in scientific practices for the definition of the models-system itself that should account 
for complex actual processes.  
What is really intriguing from the present perspective is that, despite of its high flexibility, 
FEM modelling depends on the numerical model and the aims engineers pursue. Even if it might 
seem at first that this kind of modelling is suitable for a semantic and structuralist account of 
models, it can represents a challenge to an account of models as structures related by partial 
isomorphism or partial homomorphism. If we have to account, for instance, for gusset plates 
buckling we appeal to the FEM. Now, in a structural realist stance, the mathematical model would 
be partially isomorphically mapped into sub-models (or sub-structures). But in the FEM there 
would be more than these relations. The mathematical model appears to be rather the result of a 
process for the prediction of the behavior of the system/object (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, in practice, 
engineers can modify the sub-models through an error-controlled model, which is not mapped into 
the mathematical model. The final model-system entails models that can be independent of each 
other, or just indirectly dependent.  
Furthermore, the mathematical model does not entail the exact relationships of displacement 
modeled to account for the actual buckling of a gusset plate (it must include, for instance, thermal 
coefficients depending on the material and the shape of the gusset plate). In the FEM coefficients 
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referred to empirical properties of the elements influence the model and are embodied in structural 
codes (such as the EUROCODES). The elements are positioned at the mid-surface of the actual 
layer thickness, and to do so, one does not rely on the mathematical model only. This is the case 
also for torus-shaped elements used to solve axis-symmetric problems, such as thin, thick plates, 
shells, and solids that may have cross-sections. Now, the behavior of nodes is modeled according to 
nodal (vector) displacements or degrees of freedom, which may include translations, rotations, and, 
for special applications, higher order derivatives of displacements.  
Algebraic tools, such as the theory of groups that dictate the symmetric structure of the 
mathematical model certainly are the results of a mapping process, but the latter is not related to 
models taken in themselves, rather homeomorphism and monomorphism, but the same holds for 
homo-morphism, are nothing but goal-oriented functions for validation and verification of both 
approximated models (which are sub-models of the mathematical model) and the goal-oriented 
mathematical model (see Fig. 1). The latter does not simply entail the approximated structures, but 
as a model-system include more than these relations and structures: it is goal-oriented.  The 
semantic stance claims that models are to be reconstructed as ordered n-tuples of sets: a set of 
objects; a set of properties, quantities and relations over these objects; and a set of functions on the 
quantities. The structural realist stance (French and Ladyman 1999; Bueno et al. 2002) advanced the 
thesis that in the semantic theory of models we may determine their nature by looking at partial 
isomorphism or partial homo-morphism as shaping the relation between mathematical theories and 
the world, more specifically between models and models of the world. According to our previous 
definition, this ‗static‘ approach should not be discussed within the context of the dynamical 
approach to scientific representation. However, since this stance claims that partial isomorphism or 
partial homo-morphism and a theory of models as structures can enrich and clarify scientific 
practices, a response is in order. A partial isomorphism requires that for all iR in the set of relations 
defining the model, 1R (xy), iff ,
'
1R ( ))()( yfxf and 2R (xy), iff 
'
2R ( ))()( yfxf , so that every definite 
assertion of the first model must hold in the second as well. Suaréz and Cartwright (2008) 
highlighted that this approach leads us to admit that there is no way to leave behind parts of the first 
model in moving to the second; whatever the first model definitely asserts—either that the relation 
definitely does hold or that it definitely does not—must still hold in the second model. Moreover, 
according to another structural approach (Bueno et al. 2002) the relation between mathematical 
theories and the world could be often read in terms of partial homomorphisms. Given two models 
taken as partial structures, a partial homomorphism holds between them in such a way that objects 
in the second model can possess relations that are lacked in the first. According to Suaréz and 
Cartwright (2008), this is still not sufficient to capture the fact that there may be relations positively 
ascribed to objects in the old model that one wishes to deny in the new. What counts from our 
present perspective is the fact that in engineering practices, there are criteria according to which the 
new model possesses relations lacked in the first one or that are denied in the new one. As Stein et 
al. (2004) show, there are goal-oriented error estimates or bounds that inform a mathematical 
reference model, albeit indirectly. Now, depending on the external error controlled model, the 
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homomorphism is mapped for validation from a hierarchical approximation to the goal-oriented 
mathematical model. 
It is true that between models isomorphism (non necessarily always partial) can be detected, 
but, as the case of FEM clearly shows, it is for validation purposes, and presupposes an error 
controlled model and a numerical method, which are not directly referred to the goal-oriented 
mathematical model, albeit they cannot be read off the complex modelling process of a certain 
system. 
 Model-systems including sub-models, or ‗sub-structures‘ can follow upon symmetry or 
asymmetry conditions that are exploited in order to restrict the size of the domain, and to predict the 
structural behavior of an object, by determining displacement compatibility along the element 
edges, particularly when adjacent elements are of different types, material or thickness. 
Compatibility of displacements of many nodes can usually be imposed via constraint relations 
imposed to nodes on symmetry axes, however, when it is not feasible, a (third) physical model that 
imposes the constraints may be used instead. In the model-systems the elements‘ behaviors capture 
the dominant actions of the actual system, by adding something more (elements‘ shape, empirical 
constraints, and so forth) to the mathematical model. Furthermore, it must be noticed that in the 
performance-based approach in engineering the mathematical model is not presupposed in the 
model system, rather is used as a goal-oriented framework for double-checking the consistency of 
some constraints that have been chosen according to physical laws, numerical methods, and so 
forth. If the structural realist position aims at highlighting some of the possible relations that are at 
stake in sub-models, and just one stage of a complex process, then I might find it consistent. 
However, if, on the contrary, it aims at revealing the dynamics of modelling as a process, it appears 
to fail.  
 
Conclusion  
 
From the previous discussion descends that we use symmetries in our scientific practices by 
associating them to practical functions of invariance, prediction, and restriction in order to control 
and further manipulate models and their associated phenomena. We intervene and manipulate 
certain processes according to an order that is dictated and controlled by functions, operators and so 
forth, in order to predict part of the behavior of a process under certain transformations that leave it 
invariant. However, given that models include the operations of our scientific representative 
practices, they also include the practical functions and the associated aims that inform the model-
systems. It does not mean, however, that a physical object is the product of a mere arbitrary 
construction, nor that model-systems are just structures. It is rather clear that when we adopt 
specific representative practices in sciences, particularly by using symmetry (or asymmetry) in 
modelling, we are pursuing specific aims depending on the functions of invariance,
18
 prediction and 
restriction. Representing in sciences is never independent of aims. Applications and problem 
solving strategies reveal this crucial aspect. 
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For this reason, I cannot agree with Frigg on that ―the intrinsic nature of a model-system does not 
depend on whether or not it is so used: representation is extrinsic to the medium doing the 
representing‖.19 We have seen how the dynamical approach to the question of scientific 
representation allows us to deal with crucial elements that are disregarded by current interpretations.  
From the present perspective, as it emerged in the case of symmetry, there is something 
more to be added to our conception of representation, especially scientific representation. The latter 
cannot be read in terms of mere correspondence or as a relation. As I tried to show, the use of the 
term ‗representation‘ is ambiguous, because it prevents us from seeing the dynamics underlying 
scientific processes and from explaining the fact that we use specific scientific tools to predict and 
anticipate phenomena, whose unity is incorporated and captured by model-systems and their results.  
The concept of scientific representative practices is an ideal substitute for the concept of scientific 
representation, because it entails the reference to the way in which we order and restrict data, laws 
and phenomena, not only in a descriptive, but also in an explanatory way. A desirable account of 
scientific representative practices looks at the purposes that we may inject into models via the 
performance of practical functions. I suggested that this account should be considered as a 
‗dynamical approach‘ to the question of scientific representation. In the specific context of this 
paper, I have shown that to expound the reasons why we use symmetries in sciences means to deal 
with a certain conception of objectivity as invariance (see Part II, example A), and, according to the 
proposed view, the question of objectivity can be inserted in the context of a dynamical approach to 
representative practices. Objectivity is linked to practical functions and aims of scientific 
representative practices: the more the results of a model-system fit the aims at stake (such as 
explaining the failure of a bridge or the replication of DNA by comparing two double-helix 
structures) and show consistency, the more the operations and functions they are attached to acquire 
objectivity. Objectivity ceases to be read in terms of correspondence and becomes a process that 
includes the operations we perform, as well as their aims. 
The concept of representative practices certainly tells us that we look at permanent 
properties, primary properties as relations of invariance of/in a certain system, but also that this is 
not the whole story. As I tried to show, it is with the identification of other crucial practical 
functions and the aims that we associate to models that we can give a more satisfactory account of 
scientific practices,
20
 and then throw a fresh light on the use of symmetries in sciences. 
Conclusively, scientific representative practices (that refer to something more than a mere mapping,  
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 Furthermore to investigate these practices from a dynamical perspective means to analyze the relationship between 
scientific and artistic representative practices also, because they depend on the same ground: human social activity. In 
scientific representative practices we relate the operation of symmetries to images, to visualization, qualitative and 
material properties, as it is in the case of lattices, molecule models, snowflakes etc. Now, these ‗representations‘ turn 
out to be beautiful as well. We often experience the paradox that in representing something for scientific purposes, it 
finally turns out to be part of another representative approach, or better representative practice, which pertains to art. 
We have still to explain why and how this is possible. 
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partial isomorphism or partial homo-morphism) are portrayed as aim-directed processes of ordering 
phenomena or laws according to a chosen rule embodied by models that must respond at least to 
one of the three abovementioned functions: invariance, prediction, and restriction. Although it is far 
from being complete, the proposed approach to scientific representative practices ties together the 
practical functions and the aims associated to the processes of acquisition of the correspondence 
between model-systems and target-systems. Further discussion concerns the ground of the 
agreement on the use of certain models and the interpretations of different results descending from 
scientific practices. More importantly, the present approach, perhaps, entails the possibility of re-
defining or abandoning the concept of correspondence in the current debate on scientific 
representation. But this is another question that deserves further discussion. 
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Fig. 1 Sequence of physical structures, mathematical models and numerical methods similar to the one 
proposed by Stein et al. 2004. Note that models related through partial isomorphism would be just a small 
part of the process underlying the goal-oriented mathematical model. 
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